Practical implementations of secret-key generation are often based on sequential strategies, which handle reliability and secrecy in two successive steps, called reconciliation and privacy amplification. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach based on polar codes that jointly deals with reliability and secrecy. Specifically, we propose secret-key capacityachieving polar coding schemes for the following models: (i) the degraded binary memoryless source (DBMS) model with rateunlimited public communication, (ii) the DBMS model with oneway rate-limited public communication, (iii) the 1-to-m broadcast model and (iv) the Markov tree model with uniform marginals. For models (i) and (ii) our coding schemes remain valid for nondegraded sources, although they may not achieve the secret-key capacity. For models (i), (ii) and (iii), our schemes rely on preshared secret seed of negligible rate; however, we provide special cases of these models for which no seed is required. Finally, we show an application of our results to secrecy and privacy for biometric systems. We thus provide the first examples of lowcomplexity secret-key capacity-achieving schemes that are able to handle vector quantization for model (ii), or multiterminal communication for models (iii) and (iv).
already been successfully used for secrecy in the context of symmetric degraded wire-tap channel model [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] , or more recently, arbitrary broadcast channel with confidential messages [24] , [25] , and for the Slepian-Wolf coding problem [26] [27] [28] [29] , which is particularly relevant to secretkey generation. Note also that in [30] , the journal version of [28] , a first application of polar coding to a basic secret key generation setting was proposed. Unlike sequential methods, which successively handle reliability and secrecy, our schemes jointly deal with reliability and secrecy (see Definition 2 for more details). Both the sequential reliability-secrecy approach, and the direct approach with polar codes have their advantages. On the one hand, sequential methods offer flexibility in design by separating reliability and secrecy and, unlike polar coding schemes, are known to remain optimal for two-way rate-limited communication and continuous nondegraded sources [11] . On the other hand, polar coding schemes may be easier to design and operate at lesser complexity in some scenarios. They also appear to be convenient to deal with vector quantization when the public communication is rate-limited.
Our main contribution is to develop polar coding schemes that achieve the secret-key capacity for the following models.
• The degraded binary memoryless source (DBMS) model with rate-unlimited public communication; • The DBMS model with one-way rate-limited public communication; • The 1-to-m broadcast model;
• The Markov tree model with uniform marginals. For the first two models, the proposed polar coding schemes may also be used to generate secret keys for non-degraded sources, although they may not achieve the secret-key capacity. For the first three models, we assume that the legitimate users initialize their communication with a shared secret seed, 1 whose length is negligible compared to the number of source samples used to generate a key. As shown in Sections III-V, there also exist special cases of the source statistics for which no seed is required.
Note that [32] , obtained independently from [1] , develops an alternative polar coding solution for the BMS model with rate-unlimited public communication. The major difference between their approach and ours is that their construction is sequential, i.e., it successively deals with reliability and secrecy by means of reconciliation and privacy amplification, whereas our approach jointly deals with reliability and secrecy. The construction in [32, Th. 7] has the advantage of not requiring a seed. On the other hand, our protocol only requires one "polarization layer," whose construction is efficient, whereas the sequential approach of [32] requires an inner and an outer layer, the latter having no known efficient code construction as discussed in [32, .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formally introduces some notation and the general multi-terminal secret-key generation problem, which encompasses all the models specialized in subsequent sections. Section III, describes a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar codes for the DBMS model with unlimited communication rate. Section IV provides a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar codes for the DBMS model with one-way rate-limited public communication. Section V develops a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar codes for the 1-to-m broadcast model. Section VI studies a Markov tree model with uniform marginals and provides a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar codes. Finally, Section VII, shows how to apply the results to the related problem of privacy and secrecy for key generation in some biometric systems.
II. MULTITERMINAL SECRET-KEY GENERATION
We start by introducing some notation used throughout the paper. We define the integer interval a, b , as the set of integers between a and b . We denote the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p ∈ [0, 1] by B( p). For n ∈ N and N 2 n , we let G N 1 0 1 1 ⊗n be the source polarization transform defined in [26] . We note the components of a vector, X 1:N with superscripts, i.e., X 1:N (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X N ). Finally, we denote the variational distance and the divergence between two distributions by V(·, ·) and D(·||·), respectively.
We now recall the general model for multiterminal secretkey generation [5] . Let m 2 be the number of terminals that wish to generate a common secret-key. Set M 1, m , and let Z and X i , for i ∈ M be arbitrary finite alphabets. Define X M as the Cartesian product of X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m . Consider a discrete memoryless multiple source X M Z, p X M Z , where X M (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m ) and the Cartesian product X M × Z is abbreviated as X M Z. For i ∈ M, Terminal i observes the component X i of X M Z, p X M Z , whereas an eavesdropper observes the component Z . The source is assumed to be outside the control of all parties, but its statistics are known to all parties. Communication is allowed between terminals over an authenticated noiseless public channel with communication rate R p ∈ R + ∪{+∞}. A secret-key generation strategy is then formally defined as follows.
Definition 1: Let R p ∈ R + ∪{+∞}. Let K be a key alphabet of size 2 N R . The protocol defined by the following steps is called a (2 N R , N, R p ) secret-key generation strategy with public communication, and is denoted by S N . 1) Terminal i , i ∈ M, observes X 1:N i .
2) The m terminals communicate, possibly interactively, over the public channel. All the public inter-terminal communications are collectively denoted by F and satisfy H (F) N R p . 3) Terminal i , i ∈ M, computes K i (X 1:N i , F) ∈ K. Let K be a random variable taking values in K. The performance of a secret-key generation strategy S N that allows the terminals in M to agree on the key K is measured in terms of • the average probability of error between the keys P e (S N ) P[∃i ∈ M : K = K i ], • the information leakage to the eavesdropper L(S N ) I (K ; Z 1:N F), • the uniformity of the key U(S N ) log 2 N R − H (K ). Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the secret-key capacity and is denoted C WSK (R p ). In the special case where Eve has no access to the component Z of the source, the secret-key capacity is denoted C SK (R p ). One also says that perfect secrecy is achieved if L(S N ) = 0.
In this paper, we develop low-complexity secret-key capacity-achieving schemes based on polar codes for special cases of the general model presented in Definition 1. In the following, the blocklength, N, used by the legitimate users is a power of 2. Moreover, we say that the legitimate users share a secret seed, if they share a secret sequence of d N ∈ N uniformly distributed bits, and we define the seed rate as d N /N. To avoid modifying the secret-key capacity with the introduction of a seed, we only consider schemes with vanishing seed rate.
III. MODEL 1: SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH RATE-UNLIMITED PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
The precise model and known results are described in Section III-A. Our proposed polar coding scheme is given in Section III-B and analyzed in Section III-C.
A. Secret-Key Generation Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , Model 1 consists of m = 2 legitimate terminals. We use X instead of X 1 and Y instead of X 2 for convenience. We assume that X = {0, 1} and that the public channel has an unlimited communication rate R p = +∞. We call this setup the BMS model with rateunlimited public communication. The following results are known for this model.
Theorem 1 [2] , [3] : Consider a BMS (X YZ, p XY Z ). If X → Y → Z , then the secret-key capacity C WSK (+∞) is
Moreover, the secret-key capacity can be achieved by one-way communication.
When the eavesdropper has no access to the source component Z , one obtains the following expression for the secret-key capacity.
Corollary 1 [2] , [3] :
Moreover, the secret-key capacity can be achieved using only one-way communication.
Such a model is motivated by the sources of randomness that can be generated from wireless communication channel gains [33] , [34] . In such settings, the wireless channel gains c A→B characterizing the channel from Alice to Bob, c B→A characterizing the channel from Bob to Alice, and the pair (c A→E , c B→E ), characterizing the channels to Eve, may be used as the variables X, Y , and Z , respectively, of Model 1.
B. Polar Coding Scheme
In the following, we assume that I (X; Y ) − I (X; Z ) > 0 but we do not assume that X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain; we discuss at the end of the section how the coding scheme simplifies when X → Y → Z holds.
Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . Set U 1:
The exact encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively, and we provide here a high-level discussion of their operation. The set H X |Y is the set of indices containing "high-entropy bits" such that 
{Fraction of the key used as a seed for the next block} 4: [26] . In our coding scheme, Alice therefore publicly transmits U 1:N [H X |Y ] to allow Bob to reconstruct U 1:N . By construction, the set V X |Z is the set of indices containing "very-high entropy bits" such that U 1:N [V X |Z ] is almost uniform and independent of the eavesdropper's observations Z 1:N . Consequently, the secret-key should be chosen as a subvector of U 1:N [V X |Z ]; specifically, since U 1:N [H X |Y ] is publicly transmitted, it is natural to use U 1:N [V X |Z \H X |Y ] as the secret key. Unfortunately, H X |Y ⊂ V X |Z in general, so that the public communication of
To circumvent this issue, our protocol uses a secret seed to protect the transmission of the bits in positions H X |Y \V X |Z with a one-time-pad. In addition, our scheme operates over k blocks of size N to handle non-degraded sources and to make the seed rate negligible. In every Block i ∈ 1, k Alice generates a secret key K i together with a seed K i used in the next block. Overall, Alice obtains a vector of secret keys K 1:k [K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K k ] while Bob obtains a vector of estimates K 1:
Remark 1: For convenience, Algorithm 1 does not distinguish the last block from the others; however, there is no need to create a seed in Block k, so that one may actually use U 1:N k [V X |Z \H X |Y ] as the key K k and slightly increase the key rate. For a large number of blocks k, this distinction has negligible impact on the achievable rates.
Remark 2: The need for a seed is not an artifact of our proof, but a fundamental requirement of our single polarization approach to generate secret keys and public messages. In fact, a memoryless source cannot be near losslessly compressed at a rate close to the entropy and simultaneously ensure that the encoded messages are nearly uniformly distributed in variational distance [35, Sec. V] . In the context of secret-key generation with polar codes, this translates into the condition H X |Y ⊂ V X |Z and in the impossibility of simultaneously ensuring strong secrecy and reliability. Our solution follows ideas from [36] and [37] , showing that the impossibility may be circumvented if the encoder and the decoder share a small seed beforehand; without seed, only weak secrecy would be ensured.
As shown in Section III-C, a careful analysis of the algorithms leads to the following result.
Theorem 2: Consider a BMS (X YZ, p XY Z ). Assume that Alice and Bob share a secret seed. The secret-key rate I (X; Y ) − I (X; Z ) is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size N, and whose computational complexity is O(k N log N). Moreover, the seed rate can be chosen in o 2 −N α , α < 1/2.
Proof: See Section III-C. Corollary 2: When X → Y → Z , the secret-key capacity of Theorem 1 is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Moreover, one does not need to encode over several blocks, i.e., one can choose k = 1, and the seed rate is o(N). However, encoding over several blocks for this case allows one to reduce the seed rate from o(N) to o(2 −N α ), α < 1/2.
Proof: See Appendix A-A. Note that, in the special case of a symmetric degraded BMS, 2 Corollary 2 may be indirectly obtained from wiretap codes and [23] , following the approach of [2] , [17, Sec. 4.2.1] . However, this indirect proof might not translate into practical implementations because it requires much more public channel communication.
Although the seed rate in Theorem 2 or Corollary 2 may be made arbitrarily small, it is valuable to identify examples for which no seed is required. We provide two such examples in Proposition 1, which corresponds to the privacy amplification setting of [38] , and in Proposition 2, which corresponds to a case when the source has uniform marginals and the eavesdropper has no access to correlated observations of the source.
Proposition 1: Consider a BMS (X YZ, p XY Z ). Assume that Alice and Bob have the same observations, i.e., X = Y ; then the secret-key capacity C WSK = H (X|Z ) is achievable with a polar coding scheme, whose computational complexity is O(N log N).
Proof: See Appendix A-B. Proposition 2: Consider a BMS (X Y, p XY ) with X ∼ B(1/2). The secret-key capacity C SK (+∞) given in Corollary 1 is achievable with perfect secrecy with a polar coding scheme, whose computational complexity is O(N log N). 2 That is, when X, Y , and Z are connected by symmetric channels. Proof: See Appendix A-C. Note that the model studied in Proposition 2 includes [39, Model 1] as a special case, and does not require the construction of a standard array, whose size grows exponentially with the blocklength.
C. Analysis of Polar Coding Scheme: Proof of Theorem 2
A functional dependence graph of the block encoding scheme of Section III-B is depicted in Figure 2 to help the reader identify the dependencies among the variables introduced by the block-coding scheme.
1) Preliminary Result: We first state a lemma that will be useful for the scheme analysis. Proof: See Appendix A-D. Note that lim N→+∞ |H X |Y |/N = H (X|Y ) follows from [26] , but Lemma 1 requires a slightly different proof based on Lemma 16 in the appendix.
2) Existence of A XY Z : Observe that
Hence, by Lemma 1 and [26] , we have
Since I (X; Y ) − I (X; Z ) > 0 by assumption, we conclude that |V X |Z \H X |Y | − |H X |Y \V X |Z | > 0 for N large enough and A XY Z exists.
3) Asymptotic Key Rate: For i ∈ 1, k , we note |K i | the length of the vector K i . The length of the overall key generated is
Hence, by Lemma 1 and [26] , the asymptotic key rate is
4) Reliability:
Let i ∈ 2, k . Note that F i is correctly received only when Bob possesses a correct estimate of the seed K i−1 , i.e., when U 1:N i−1 is correctly reconstructed. We note F i the estimate of F i formed by Bob from ( U 1:N i−1 , M i ) and define the event E F i {F i = F i }. Then,
where (a) follows because Bob can reconstruct
with error probability less than Nδ N [26] , (b) holds by induction, (c) holds by [26] and because K 0 is known to Bob. Using the union bound,
5) Key Uniformity:
We first prove the uniformity of the key in each block i using the following lemma.
Lemma 2: In every block i ∈ 1, k , the vector [K i , K i ] is nearly uniform, in the sense that
Proof: For i ∈ 1, k , we have
where (a) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (b) holds by definition of V X |Z and because conditioning reduces entropy. Finally, note that since |K i |− H (K i | K i ) > 0, we have
It remains to show that the overall key K 1:k is uniform, as well. Specifically, we have
where (a) holds because X 1:N i is independent of of X 1:N 1:i−1 for any i ∈ 1, k , and (b) holds by Lemma 2. Hence,
(2)
6) Strong Secrecy:
We first show that secrecy holds for each block using the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For each Block i ∈ 1, k , [K i , K i ] is a secret key. Specifically,
where (a) holds by definition of K i , K i , and F i , (b) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (c) holds by definition of V X |Z . Therefore, we obtain
where (d) holds by definition of M i , (e) holds by (3) and positivity of mutual information, ( f ) holds by Lemma 2.
We now state two lemmas that will be used to show that secrecy holds for the global scheme.
Lemma 4: For i ∈ 1, k , we have for N large enough
Proof: See Appendix A-E. Lemma 5: For i ∈ 2, k , define
We have
We thus obtain
where (a) follows by Lemma 5, (b) follows by Lemma 4 and Lemma 3. 7) Seed Rate: The seed rate required to initialize the coding scheme is negligible since
Note that the seed rate may be chosen to decrease exponentially fast to zero with N since we may choose k = 2 N α , α < β and still have lim N→∞ P e (S N ) = 0 by (1), lim N→∞ U e (S N ) = 0 by (2), and lim N→∞ L e (S N ) = 0 by (5) and (4).
IV. MODEL 2: SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH RATE-LIMITED PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
We now move to the second key generation model, which differs from Model 1 by restricting the public communication to be rate-limited and one way from Alice to Bob. The organization follows that of Section III.
A. Secret-Key Generation Model
As illustrated in Fig. 3 , we set again m = 2 and we use X instead of X 1 , Y instead of X 2 for convenience. We assume that X = {0, 1} and that Alice and Bob are constrained to only use one-way communication over an authenticated noiseless public channel with limited rate R p ∈ R. We call this setup the BMS model with rate-limited public communication. The following results are known for the model. 
Closed-form expressions of the secret-key capacity are only known for specific sources. See the following example.
where ⊕ denotes the modulo-2 addition. Then, by [11, Proposition 5.3] , the secret-key capacity is
where β 0 must satisfy 4
is the binary entropy function, and the associative and commutative operation is defined as
Corollary 3: Let (X YZ, p XY Z ) be a BMS and R p ∈ R + be the public communication rate. The one-way rate-limited secret-key capacity is
The practical justification for Model 2 is similar to that for Model 1; however, Model 2 allows us to account for rate-limited communication constraints, which is relevant in applications with stringent bandwidth constraints, such as wireless sensor networks. We will also see in Section VII that such constraint may account for privacy-leakage constraints in biometric systems.
The main challenge in designing a coding scheme for Model 2 is to address the problem of vector quantization with side information at the receiver. Previous polar coding results on lossy source coding with lossless reconstruction of the vector quantized version of the source are reported in [41] and [42] ; our contribution is to extend these results when side information is available at the receiver, and to show how to apply such technique to secret-key generation with rate-limited public communication.
B. Polar Coding Scheme
Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . Fix a joint probability distribution
The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4. The high-level principles are similar to that of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, and we only highlight here the differences. Instead of directly operating on the source symbols, Alice first constructs a vector quantized version V 1:N of X 1:N , whose distribution is close to that of V 1:N . This statement is made more precise in Lemma 6, but a crucial part of the proof is to introduce a stochastic encoder, as in successive cancellation encoding for lossy source coding [41] , [42] . The randomness R 1 used in the encoder is publicly transmitted to Bob and reused over several blocks so that its rate vanishes to zero as the number of blocks increases; however, reusing R 1 creates additional dependencies between the variables of the different blocks, which must be carefully taken into account in the secrecy analysis. The choice of public messages and keys is then similar to those in Section III-B, using V 1:N instead of X 1:N .
Remark 3: One may actually use U 1:N k [V U |Z \H U |Y ] as the key K k and slightly increase the key rate in Algorithm 3. However, one does not distinguish the last block from the others for convenience -see Remark 1.
As shown in Section IV-C, the analysis of Algorithm 3 and Algotithm 4 leads to the following result. 
6:
Algorithm 4 Bob's Decoding Algorithm for Model 2
Require: The secret key K 0 and the set A U Y Z defined in Algorithm 3; for every Block i ∈ 1, k , the observations Y 1:N i from the source, the message M i . transmitted by Alice; the vector R 1 transmitted by Alice. 1: 
with the successive cancellation decoder of [26] 4:
public communication rate. The secret-key rate defined by
is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 3
and Algorithm 4, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size N, and whose computational complexity is O(k N log N). Moreover, the seed rate can be chosen in o 2 −N α , α < 1/2. Proof: See Section IV-C. The following corollary states sufficient conditions to avoid block encoding.
, and the test-channels p Y |X and p Z |X are symmetric, 5 then the secretkey capacity of Theorem 3 is achieved by the polar coding scheme for Block 1 in Algorithm 3 with A U Y Z = ∅, R 1 a constant sequence, and a seed rate in o(N).
Proof: See Appendix B-A. Finally, the following proposition provides sufficient conditions to avoid block encoding and a pre-shared seed. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4 and Corollary 4 and is omitted.
Proposition 3: If the eavesdropper has no access to correlated observations of the source, X ∼ B(1/2), and the test-channel p Y |X is symmetric, then the secret-key capacity of Corollary 3 is achieved by the polar coding scheme for
, and R 1 a constant sequence.
C. Analysis of Polar Coding Scheme: Proof of Theorem 4
A functional dependence graph for the coding scheme of Section IV-B is depicted in Fig. 4 for convenience.
1) Preliminary Result: Lemma 6: For every i ∈ 1, k , the random variable V 1:N i resulting from Algorithm 3 has a joint distribution p X 1:N
Hence, by Pinsker's inequality
Hence, by Lemma 1 and [26] , we have 5 As in Example 1 for instance.
3) Communication Rate: The total communication is
where the last equality holds because U → X → Y and thus
Hence, the communication rate is by Lemma 1 and [26] ,
4) Key Rate:
The length of the key generated is
Hence, the key rate is by Lemma 1 and [26] ,
with the successive cancellation encoder of [26] . Consider an optimal coupling [41] , [43] 
Nδ N by [26] , (c) holds by induction, (d) holds by [26] and because K 0 is known to Bob. Hence,
. Then, similarly to Section III-C4, we obtain with a union bound
6) Key Uniformity:
We first show that the key is nearly uniform for every block in the following lemma.
Lemma 7: For every block i ∈ 1, k , the vector 
In particular, we also have
Proof: See Appendix B-C. Lemma 9: For i ∈ 1, k , we have for N large enough
We now show that the global key K 1:k is uniform. Specifically, we have
where (a) holds because K i → R 1 → K 1:i−1 for any i ∈ 1, k , (b) holds by Lemma 9, (c) holds by Lemma 8. Hence,
7) Strong Secrecy: Because of the successive cancellation encoding, the secrecy analysis is more involved than for Model 1.
Lemma 10: For i ∈ 1, k , we have for N large enough
Proof: See Appendix B-E. The following lemma shows that secrecy holds for each block.
Lemma 11: For each Block i ∈ 1, k , [K i , K i ] is a secret key in the sense that
where q U V U |Z is the uniform distribution over 1, 2 |V U |Z | , and by the proof of Lemma 8, we have
Therefore,
where (a) holds because ( (13), (c) holds by Lemma 10.
Then, we obtain
where (d) holds by definition of M i , (e) holds by the chain rule and positivity of mutual information, ( f ) holds because
holds by Lemma 8 and Lemma 9. Finally, we conclude by combining (14) and (15) .
We now state a lemma that will be used to show that secrecy holds for the global scheme.
Lemma 12: For i ∈ 2, k , define
Proof: See Appendix B-F. We thus obtain
where (a) follows from Lemma 12, (b) holds by Lemma 9, (c) holds by Lemma 11. 8) Seed Rate: The seed rate required to initialize the coding scheme is
Note that the seed rate could be chosen to decrease exponentially fast to zero with N, since we may choose k = 2 N α , α < β, and still have lim N→∞ P e (S N ) = 0 by (8), lim N→∞ U e (S N ) = 0 by (11) , and lim N→∞ L e (S N ) = 0 by (16) along with (9), (10), (12) .
V. MODEL 3: A MULTITERMINAL BROADCAST MODEL
In this section, we develop a polar coding scheme for a multiterminal broadcast model. Sections V-A to V-C analyze a model with an arbitrary number of terminals but specific source statistics. The extension of the model to general sources is discussed in Section V-D for the case of three terminals.
A. Secret-Key Generation Model
As illustrated in Fig. 5 , we assume that every Terminal i ∈ M\{1} observes a degraded version of the observation Require: K , a secret key of size |H X 1 |X i min \V X 1 | shared by all terminals beforehand; the observations X 1:N 1 from the source. 1 
, independent of X 1 . Furthermore, we suppose that the eavesdropper does not have access to an observation of the source. We call this setup the 1-to-m broadcast model, and we recall expression of the secret-key capacity in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 [4] : Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model. The secret-key capacity C SK (+∞) is given by
B. Polar Coding Scheme
Define i min argmin i∈M\{1} I (X 1 ; X i ) such that
Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . We set U 1:N
We also define the sets
The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6, respectively. The highlevel principle behind the operation of the algorithm is the following. The set H X 1 |X i contains the indices such that
by [26] . Using a universality argument formalized in Lemma 13, we will show that it is actually sufficient to transmit U 1:N [H X 1 |X i min ] to allow all the terminals to near losslessly reconstruct U 1:N . The secret key common to all terminals may then be chosen as a subset of U 1:N [V X 1 ]; since U 1:N [H X 1 |X i min ] has been publicly transmitted, the secret-key is chosen as
In general, H X 1 |X i min ⊂ V X 1 , and the public communication may leak some information about the key; consequently, as in Model 1 and Model 2, the protocol requires a pre-shared seed to protect the transmission of U 1:
As shown in Section V-C, we have the following result. Theorem 5: Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model of Section V-A. Assume that all terminals share a seed, whose rate can be chosen in o(N). The secret-key capacity C SK (+∞) given in Proposition 4 is achieved by the polar coding scheme in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6, whose computational complexity is O (N log N) .
Proof: See Section V-C. The following corollary shows that no seed is required when the source has uniform marginals.
Corollary 5: Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model. Assume that the source has uniform marginal, that is, X 1 ∼ B(1/2). The secret-key capacity C SK (+∞) given in Proposition 4 is achievable with perfect secrecy with the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 choosing F = ∅ and replacing the set V X 1 by H X 1 wherever it appears.
We omit the proof of Corollary 5, which is similar to the ones of Theorem 5 and Proposition 2. Note that the model studied in Corollary 5 is a particular case of [39, Model 3] . However, the construction proposed in [39, Model 3] relies again on a standard array, whose size grows exponentially with the blocklength. Note also that a polar coding scheme is proposed in Section VI for [ 
2) Seed Rate: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4, we can show that the seed rate is
3) Reliability:
We make use of the following lemma.
We setX
that is, p X 1X ( j ) i min = p X 1 X i min . We now define the sets
By the data processing equality, we have
By [26, Th. 3] and by Lemma 13, for j ∈ M\{1},
4) Strong Secrecy and Key Uniformity: Secrecy and uniformity hold since,
where the last inequality can be shown as in the proof of Theorem 4.
D. An Extension to General Sources
The multiterminal model described in Section V-A only considers binary symmetric channels between the components of the source. A natural question is whether a similar coding scheme may be developed for general sources. We answer this by the affirmative for the case of three terminals; however, the coding scheme is significantly more involved than the one in Section V-B. In the following, we can assume without loss of generality that
Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . We note U 1:N X 2 1:N G N , and for δ N 2 −N β , where β ∈]0, 1/2[, we define the following sets
We also define
which are such that V X 2 \H X 2 |X 1 = K X M ∪K X M and K X M ∩K X M = ∅. Finally, we define
Algorithm 7 Encoding Algorithm for Terminal 2 in Model 3
Require: k independent secret keys { K i } i∈ 1,k of size |F X 2 |X 1 ∪F X 2 |X 3 | shared by all terminals beforehand; for every block i ∈ 1, k , the observations (X 2 ) 1:N i from the source. F X M , a subset of F X 2 |X 1 \F X 2 |X 3 with size |K X M |. 1: for Block i = 1 to k do 2: if i = 1 then 3:
publicly to all Terminals 9: else if i = k then 10:
k , F k ⊕ K k ,F k ] publicly to all Terminals 17: else 18:
publicly to all Terminals 25: end if 26 : end for 27: 
The encoding and decoding algorithms are provided in Algorithm 7, Algorithm 8, and Algorithm 9. The underlying principle is to make Terminals 1 and 3 reconstruct X 1:N 2 and to choose the secret key as a subset of U 1:N . For the public communication, we perform universal source coding with side information with an idea similar to [44] . Terminal 2 thus performs encoding over k blocks of size N to transmit the side information necessary to reconstruct X 1:kN 2 at Terminals 1 and 3. Specifically, Terminal 1 decodes the blocks in order from 1 to k, so that it is able to estimate U 1:N i [H X 2 |X 1 ] by processing the observations and the public communication in blocks 1 to i . In contrast, Terminal 3 decodes the blocks in reverse order starting from k down to 1, so that it is able to estimate U 1:N i [H X 2 |X 3 ] by processing the observations and the public communication in blocks k down to i . 
Algorithm 9 Decoding Algorithm for Terminal 3 in Model 3
Require: 
One of the challenges is to extract a uniform key from U 1:N 1:k independent of the public communication messages, which we address by protecting some of the public communication corresponding to Block i with part of the secret-key extracted in Block i − 1. Moreover, similarly to Algorithms 1 and 3, a small secret seed must be shared by the users to protect the bits in positions H X 2 |X 1 \V X 2 ∪ H X 2 |X 3 \V X 2 , which must be revealed to allow reconstruction of the secret-key by Terminals 1 and 3, but that may also leak information about the secret key.
The following remarks clarify why Algorithms 7, 8, and 9 achieve the desired behavior.
Remark 4: In every block i , Terminal 1 observes
Using its estimate of the keyK i from the previous block, Terminal 1 estimates [F (1) i , F (2) i , F i ], which contains U 1:N i [H X 2 |X 1 ] by construction. Hence, Terminal 1 has ability to run the successive cancellation decoder and reconstruct U 1:N i . Remark 5: In Block k, Terminal 3 has access to F (2) k , F k , andF k using M k and K k .
which combined with F k and F k allows Terminal 3 to obtain U
1:N k [H X 2 |X 3 ].
Hence, Terminal 3 has the ability to run the successive cancellation decoder and reconstruct U
1:N k . For Block i ∈ k − 1, 1 , observe that if U 1:N i+1 [F X M ] = U 1:N i+1 [F X M ], then we have [F (1) i+1 ⊕K i ⊕ U 1:N i+1 [F X M ], F (2) i , F i ] = [U 1:N i [K X M ], F (2) i , F i ] = [U 1:N i [F X 2 |X 3 \F X 2 |X 1 ], F (2) i , F i ] ⊃ [U 1:N i [F X 2 |X 3 \F X 2 |X 1 ], U 1:N i [F X 2 |X 1 ∩ F X 2 |X 3 ], F i ] ⊃ U 1:N i [H X 2 |X 3 ].
Consequently, Terminal 3 can form an estimate of
i , F i ] and apply the successive cancellation decoder to form U 1:N i an estimate of U 1:N i . Theorem 6: Assume the general setting of Section II with m = 3, X 1 = X 2 = X 3 = { 0, 1}, rate-unlimited public communication, i.e., R p = +∞, and Z = ∅, i.e., the eavesdropper does not have access to the observation of the source component Z . Assume that all terminals share a seed, whose rate can be chosen in o(N). The secret-key rate
is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 7 and Algorithms 8, 9, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size N, and whose complexity is O(k N log N).
Proof: See Appendix C.
As a corollary we obtain the following result for a broadcast model with three terminals.
Corollary 6: Assume the broadcast setting of Section V-A with m = 3, X 1 = X 2 = X 3 = { 0, 1}, and an arbitrary distribution p X M . Assume that all terminals share a seed, whose rate can be chosen in o(N). The secret-key key capacity C s (+∞) = min(I (X 1 ; X 2 ), I (X 2 ; X 3 )) is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 7 and Algorithms 8, 9, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size N, and whose complexity is O (k N log N) . Example of Markov tree model with uniform marginal for m = 15. Each vertex represent the random variable observed by a given terminal, and each edge can be seen as a binary symmetric test channel. We have noted (n 0 , n 1 )
VI. MODEL 4: MULTITERMINAL MARKOV TREE MODEL WITH UNIFORM MARGINALS

A. Secret-Key Generation Model
The model for which we now develop a polar coding scheme was first introduced in [39, Model 3] . We assume that all the observation alphabets are X i = {0, 1} for i ∈ M. As illustrated in Fig. 6 , consider a tree T with vertex set V(T ) M and edge set E(T ). The joint probability distribution p X M is characterized as follows.
which means that p X i = p X j is uniform and the test channel between X i and X j is a binary symmetric channel with parameter p i, j . Furthermore, we suppose that the eavesdropper does not have access to the observation of the source component Z . This setup is called the Markov tree model with uniform marginals. The expression of the secret-key capacity is recalled in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 [4] : Consider the Markov tree model with uniform marginal. The secret-key capacity C SK (+∞) is given by
B. Polar Coding Scheme
We first introduce some notation for the coding scheme. For any i ∈ M, we note N j (i ) the set of vertices in V(T ) that are at distance j from vertex i . We note (n 0 , n 1 ) argmin (i, j )∈E(T ) I (X i ; X j ). We also consider for the encoding process the tree T as a rooted tree with root X n 0 . An example is depicted in Figure 6 .
Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . For j ∈ M, we set U 1:N j X 1:N j G N . For j 1 ∈ M, j 2 ∈ M\{ j 1 }, and δ N 2 −N β , β ∈]0, 1/2[, we define the sets
Algorithm 10 Encoding Algorithm for Model 4 1: F n 0 ← U 1:N n 0 H X n 0 |X n 1 .
2: Terminal n 0 transmits F n 0 publicly. 3: Define d as the maximal distance between the vertex n 0 and the vertices in V(T ). 4: for i = 1 to d − 1 do 5: for j ∈ N i (n 0 ) do 6: if N 1 ( j ) ∩ N i+1 (n 0 ) = ∅ then 7: Define j * arg max 9: Terminal j transmits F i, j publicly 10:
end if 11: end for 12: end for 13: 
Algorithm 11 Decoding Algorithm for Model 4
Require: Observations from the source, and public messages F. 1: With F n 0 = U 1:N n 0 H X n 0 |X n 1 , the terminals in N 1 (n 0 ) estimate X 1:N n 0 with the successive cancellation decoder of [26] , and then form K an estimate of K . 2: Let k ∈ 1, d − 1 , j ∈ N k+1 (n 0 ) and define the singleton
(at distance k from the root) with the successive cancellation decoder of [26] . By repeating this process, Terminal j is successively able to form the estimate of sources closer to the root, X 1:N i k−1 , X 1:N i k−2 , …, X 1:N i 1 , for some i 1 ∈ N 1 (n 0 ), i 2 ∈ N 2 (n 0 ), …, i k−1 ∈ N k−1 (n 0 ). Finally, from its estimate of X 1:N i 1 , Terminal j estimates X 1:N n 0 and forms K an estimate of K . 3: return K The exact encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 10 and Algorithm 11. The principle of their operation is to have all terminal reconstruct U 1:N n 0 and choose the key as a subvector of U 1:N n 0 . The idea behind the interterminal communication, which is illustrated in Figure 7 , is to take advantage of the tree structure to make all Terminals reconstruct X 1:N n 0 ; the source uniformity plays a crucial role to develop a universal result in Lemma 14, similar to the one obtained for the broadcast model in Lemma 13. Although the assumption of uniform marginal is required in our proof, a side benefit is that no pre-shared seed is needed to ensure strong secrecy.
We note F the set of indices (i, j ) for which F i, j is defined. We note the collective inter-terminals communication as
The analysis of the scheme in Section VI-C leads to the following result.
Theorem 7: Consider the Markov tree model with uniform marginals. The secret-key capacity C SK (+∞) given in Fig. 7 .
Example for the reconstruction process. A dashed-line from Terminal i to Terminal j represents a public transmission from Terminal i of the information necessary for Terminal j to reconstruct X i . A dotted-line from Terminal i to Terminal j represents a "virtual communication" and means that Terminal j is able to reconstruct X i from the information corresponding to the dashed-line leaving Terminal i -this illustrates Lemma 14. For this example we have assumed I (X n 1,2 ; X n 2,1 )
I (X n 1,2 ; X n 2,3 ), I (X n 1 ; X n 2,5 ) min{I (X n 1 ; X n 2,i )} i∈{ 2,4} , I (X n 2,1 ; X n 3,6 ) I (X n 2,1 ; X n 3,5 ), I (X n 2,2 ; X n 3, 4 ) min{I (X n 2,2 ; X n 3,i )} i∈{ 2,3} . All in all, all the terminals can reconstruct X n 0 . (N log N) . No pre-shared seed is required.
Proposition 5 is achievable with perfect secrecy with the polar coding scheme of Section VI-B, whose computational complexity is O
Proof: See Section VI-C.
C. Analysis of Polar Coding Scheme: Proof of Theorem 7
1) Key Rate: From [26] , we obtain the key rate
2) Reliability: For k ∈ 1, d , we define the singleton { j 0 } N 1 ( j ) ∩ N k−1 (n 0 ), and we show that Terminal j ∈ N k (n 0 ) can reconstruct X j 0 from F k−1, j 0 . Specifically, we establish the following.
Lemma 14: Let k ∈ 1, d , j ∈ N k (n 0 ), and define the singleton By Lemma 13 , we now that for any i ∈ D, H X j 0 |X i ⊂ H X j 0 |X i * . Then, observe that for any i ∈ D, for any x, y ∈ {0, 1},
Hence, H X j 0 |X i = H X j 0 |X i ⊂ H X j 0 |X i * = H X j 0 |X i * Lemma 14 is similar to Lemma 13; however, unlike Lemma 13, the proof of Lemma 14 requires uniform marginals. Now, observe that with F n 0 = U 1:N n 0 [H X n 0 |X n 1 ], all terminals in N 1 (n 0 ) can reconstruct X 1:N n 0 with error probability O(Nδ N ) by Lemma 14 and [26] . We then show by induction that all terminals can reconstruct X 1:N n 0 with error probability O(Nδ N ). Assume that for k ∈ 1, d − 1 , X 1:N n 0 can be reconstructed with error probability O(Nδ N ) from any X 1:N j , where j ∈ N k (n 0 ). Let j ∈ N k+1 (n 0 ) and define the singleton {i } = N k (n 0 ) ∩ N 1 ( j ). With F k,i Terminal j can reconstruct X 1:N i with error probability O(Nδ N ) by Lemma 14 and [26] . Then, since X 1:N i ∈ N k (n 0 ), Terminal j can also reconstruct X 1:N n 0 with error probability O(Nδ N ) by induction hypothesis.
We conclude that all terminals can reconstruct X 1:N n 0 and therefore K = U 1:
] with error probability P e (S N ) = O(Nδ N ). The global reconstruction process is illustrated in Figure 7 .
3) Key Uniformity: By definition of the model, X n 0 is uniform, hence, U 1:N n 0 and K U 1:N n 0 [H c X n 0 |n 1 ] are also uniform.
4) Perfect Secrecy:
We first introduce an equivalent model as follows. We start by defining for i ∈ N 1 (n 0 ),
Consequently, similarly to the proof of Lemma 14, we have
Moreover, for j ∈ M\{n 0 }. We havē
where P n 0 , j denotes the set of vertices that form a path between X n 0 and X j including j and excluding n 0 ,
We definē
andF
Lemma 15: Let j ∈ M\{n 0 }. There exists a unique i ∈ 1, d −1 such that j ∈ N i (n 0 ). As in Algorithm 10, define j * arg max
p˜j , j . We have H X j |X j * ⊂ H X n 0 |X n 1 .
Proof:
Let j ∈ M\{n 0 }. Let r j be such that p n 0 ,n 1 = p j, j * r j (such r j exists by definition of (n 0 , n 1 )), where is defined as in Example 1. We define (1) j ∼ B( p j, j * ) and
We define the dummy random variablesX j * X n 0 + (1) j and n 0 and B 1:N 1,m \{n 0 } . We have thus shown perfect secrecy.
VII. APPLICATION TO SECRECY AND PRIVACY FOR BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
In this final section, we show how the results obtained for Model 2 may be applied to the related problems of secrecy and privacy for biometric systems [45] [46] [47] [48] . As noted in [46] , the main difficulty in constructing practical codes for such problems is the need for vector quantization; we show here that polar codes offer a low-complexity solution and provably optimal solutions for the models studied in [46] . 
A. Biometric System Models
Consider two biometric sequences X 1:N and Y 1:N distributed according to the memoryless source (X Y, p XY ). Assume that X 1:N is an enrollment sequence and Y 1:N an authentication sequence observed by an encoder and a decoder, respectively. In [46] , four different models are considered. We only deal with the "generated-secret systems" and the "generated-secret systems with zero leakage," as codes for the latter models can be used for the "chosen-secret systems" and the "chosen-secret systems with zero leakage" using a masking technique [46] .
1) Generated-Secret Systems: A biometric secret generation strategy S bio N is illustrated in Fig. 8 and is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3: Let R ∈ R + . Let S be an alphabet of size 2 N R . The protocol defined by the following steps is called a (2 N R , N, R) biometric secret generation strategy.
• The encoder observes the enrollment sequence X 1:N ; Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the biometric secret capacity and is denoted C c Bio (L). For the unconditional case, P c (S bio N ) is replaced with P u (S bio N ), and the biometric secret capacity and is denoted by C u Bio (L). Note that we require a stronger security metric than in [46] . The biometric secret capacities are known and recalled below.
Theorem 8 [46] : Let (X Y, p XY ) be a BMS and L ∈ R + be a privacy leakage threshold. The conditional and unconditional biometric secret capacities are equal C c
|U| |X |. Remark 6: The equality L = I (U ; X) − I (U ; Y ) and the range constraint |U| |X | are obtained from [11] .
2) Generated-Secret Systems With Zero Leakage: A biometric secret generation strategy with zero leakage S bioZ N is describes in Figure 9 and is formally defined as follows.
Definition 5: Let R ∈ R + . Let S be an alphabet of size 2 N R . Assume that the encoder and decoder share a uniformly distributed secret-key P beforehand. The protocol defined by the following steps is called a (2 N R , N, R) biometric secret generation strategy with zero leakage.
• The encoder observes the enrollment sequence X 1:N ; • The encoder generates a secret S ∈ S from X 1:N and P; • The encoder transmits publicly to the decoder helper data M which is a function of X 1:N and P; • The decoder observes the authentication sequence Y 1:N , and computes S ∈ S from Y 1:N and P. The performance of a biometric secret generation strategy with zero leakage is measured in terms of Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the zero-leakage biometric secret capacity and is denoted C c BioZ (L). For the unconditional case P c (S bioZ N ) is replaced with P u (S bioZ N ), and the zero-leakage biometric secret capacity and is denoted C u BioZ (L). Note that we require a stronger security metric than in [46] . The zero-leakage biometric secret capacities are known and recalled below.
Theorem 9 [46] : Let (X Y, p XY ) be a BMS and K ∈ R + be a fixed length. The conditional and unconditional zero-leakage biometric secret capacities are equal C c
Remark 7: The equality K = I (U ; X) − I (U ; Y ) and the range constraint |U| |X | are obtained from [11] .
B. Polar Coding Scheme for Generated-Secret Systems
Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . Fix a joint probability distribution p XU . We note V 1:N U 1:N G N . For δ N 2 −N β , where β ∈ ]0, 1/2[, define the following sets
The scheme proposed is a special case (it corresponds to the case Z = ∅) of the scheme in Section IV-B. However, for completeness and clarity, we provide its detailed description in Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 with the notation of the biometric secret generation problem. Remark 8: One may actually use S 1:N k [V U \H U |Y ] as the S k and slightly increase the biometric secret rate in Algorithm 12. However, one does not distinguish the last block from the others for convenience -see Remark 1.
Based on the results established for Model 2 in Section IV, we obtain the following. 
5: N log N) . Moreover, the seed rate is in o 2 −N α , α < 1/2. Theorem 10 is a direct consequence of Theorem 4 for the particular case Z = ∅, since
where we have used U → X → Y , [26] , and Lemma 1.
Note also that for i ∈ 0, k − 1 , S i = o(N).
C. Polar Coding Scheme for Generated-Secret Systems With Zero Leakage
The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 14 and Algorithm 15. The difference with the scheme of Section VII-B is that the public communication Algorithm 13 Decoding Algorithm for Generated Secret Systems Require: The secret-key S 0 , and the set A U XY defined in Algorithm 12; Observations Y 1:N i and message M i transmitted by other party in every block i ∈ 1, k , vector R 1 . 1: for Block i = 1 to k do 2: 
with the successive cancellation decoder of [26] 4: 
is protected with a secret-key shared by the encoder and the decoder.
The performance of the algorithms is ensured by the following result.
Theorem 11: Consider a BMS (X Y, p XY ). For any P ∈ R, the zero-leakage biometric secret capacities C c BioZ (K ), and C u BioZ (K ), are achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 14 and Algorithms 15, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size N, and whose complexity is O(k N log N).
Remark that one only needs to prove that C c BioZ (K ) is achieved in Theorem 11, since a code that achieves C c BioZ (K ) also achieves C u BioZ (K ) by [46] . The proof of Theorem 11 for C c BioZ (K ) is similar to the proof of Theorem 4 and is thus omitted. To show that
is uniform one can use Lemma 7, then, similarly to Theorem 4, one can show that S 1:k is also uniform and that strong secrecy holds. Note also that for i ∈ 0, k − 1 , F i = o(N).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed low-complexity secret-key capacityachieving schemes based on polar coding for several classes of sources. Our schemes jointly handle secrecy and reliability, which contrasts with sequential methods that successively perform reconciliation and privacy amplification. Although sequential methods apply to more general classes of sources, our polar coding schemes may be easier to design and may operate with lesser complexity. Nevertheless, the price to be paid for low complexity is that our schemes often require a pre-shared seed, whose rate is negligible compared to the blocklength. When the eavesdropper has no access to correlated observations of the source, and when the source has uniform marginals, we have identified several configurations, including multiterminal models, for which no pre-shared seed is required. Finally, we have applied our polar coding schemes to privacy and secrecy for some biometric systems.
Our polar coding schemes are particularly convenient to handle rate-limited public communication and vector quantization, which are often the major hurdle in designing optimal secret-key generation schemes.
APPENDIX A PROOFS FOR MODEL 1 IN SECTION III
A. Proof of Corollary 2
We perform the same encoding as in Algorithm 1 for Block 1 with A XY Z = ∅. Define the set
We have = o(N) .
B. Proof of Proposition 1
1) Polar Coding Scheme: Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . We set U 1:N X 1:N G N . We define for δ N 2 −N β , β ∈]0, 1/2[, the following set
Alice and Bob define the key as K U 1:N [V X |Z ].
2) Scheme Analysis: By Lemma 1, we have a key rate that satisfies lim N→+∞ |V X |Z |/N = H (X|Z ).
Moreover, we also have secrecy and key uniformity
where (a) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (b) holds by definition of V X |Z . Finally, since X = Y , we have P e (S N ) = 0.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
1) Polar Coding Scheme: Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . We set U 1:N X 1:N G N . We define for δ N 2 −N β , β ∈ ]0, 1/2[, the following sets
We define a secret-key generation strategy S N as follows. Define the key as K U 1:N [H X \H X |Y ], and the public message as F U 1:N [H X |Y ].
2) Scheme Analysis: Observe that H X |Y ⊂ H X , because conditioning reduces entropy. We thus have by [26] , a key rate equal to
Note that the key K is uniform because X 1:N is uniform, that is
Then, by [26, Th. 3] , Bob can reconstruct K from F with an error probability satisfying P e (S N ) Nδ N .
Finally, by the key uniformity and because (H X \H X |Y ) ∩ H X |Y = ∅ , we have
which means that we obtain perfect secrecy, that is
D. Proof of Lemma 1
As in [26] , for a pair of random variables (X, Y ) distributed according to p XY over X × Y, we define the Bhattacharyya parameter as
We will need the following counterpart of [26, Proposition 1] that is proved using the same technique as [41, Lemma 20] .
Hence,
, which can be rewritten as
where, for i ∈ 1, 2 ,
As observed in [41, Lemma 20] , for i ∈ 1, 2 , A (y i ) 2 4, by the arithmetic-geometric inequality, and x → √ x 2 + a is convex for a > 0. Hence, since for i ∈ 1, 2 , P i defines a probability distribution over Y, by Jensen's inequality applied twice
We conclude by substituting
Let α ∈ ]β, 1/2[. Define the sets
Similar to [41, Th. 19] , which relies on the result in [49] , we can show with Lemma 16 lim N→+∞ |F X |Z |/N = H (X|Z ).
But, by [26, Proposition 2] , for N large enough, |F X |Z | |V X |Z |, hence, lim N→+∞ |V X |Z |/N H (X|Z ). Since we also have lim N→+∞ |H X |Z |/N = H (X|Z ), by [26] , and V X |Z ⊂ H X |Z , we conclude lim N→+∞ |V X |Z |/N = H (X|Z ).
E. Proof of Lemma 4
Let i ∈ 1, k , we note q U K , K the uniform distribution over 1, 2 |K i |+| K i | . We have,
where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by Pinsker's inequality and Lemma 2. Then, for N large enough (|K | > 4), we have (21) and because x → x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
F. Proof of Lemma 5
Let i ∈ 2, k . By applying the chain rule of mutual information repeatedly, we obtain
where
Then, note that
where the last equality follows from
We also have,
where (a) holds by 
APPENDIX B PROOFS FOR MODEL 2 IN SECTION IV
A. Proof of Corollary 4
We perform the same encoding as in Algorithm 3 for Block 1 with A U Y Z = ∅. Note that C WSK (R p ) is obtained when U is uniformly distributed by [11, Proposition 5.3] since X is uniform and the tests-channel p Y |X and p Z |X are symmetric. Hence, the rate R 1 of randomness to perform successive cancellation encoding can be set equal to zero by [41] . We also have
We conclude by Lemma 1 and [26] that |F 1 | = o(N).
B. Proof of Lemma 6
Using the notation of [50] for conditional relative entropy, we have for i ∈ 1, k , p U 1 
where (a) holds by invertibility of G n , (b) and (c) hold by the chain rule for divergence, (d) and (e) hold by (7) and by uniformity of the components of V 1:N i in V U |X .
C. Proof of Lemma 8
We have by [51, Lemma 2.7]
2 2 log 2 Nδ N (N − log 2 (2 2 log 2 Nδ N )), where the last inequality holds for N large enough by Lemma 7 and because x → x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
D. Proof of Lemma 9
We only prove the first inequality, the other is obtained similarly. Let i ∈ 1, k . We have,
where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by Pinsker's inequality and Lemma 7.
Then, for N large enough (|K | > 4), we have by [52] I (K i ; K i R 1 )
where δ (2) N 6 √ 2 log 2 √ Nδ N (N − log 2 (6 √ 2 log 2 √ Nδ N )) by (25) and because x → x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
where (d) holds by the chain rule and positivity of mutual information, (e) holds because K 1:i−1 → K i K i−1:i R 1 → M i Z 1:N i , ( f ) holds because K 1:i−1 → K i−1 R 1 → K i K i , (g) holds because K 1:i−2 → K i−1 R 1 → K i−1 , (h) holds because K 1:i−2 → R 1 → K i−1 , (i ) holds by induction.
Finally, we conclude combining (29) , (30) , and (31) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 6 1) Existence of F X M : The set F X M exists because we have assumed I (X 2 ; X 1 ) I (X 2 ; X 3 ), i.e., H (X 2 |X 1 ) H (X 2 |X 3 ). Indeed,
and lim N→∞ (|F X 2 |X 1 | − |F X 2 |X 3 |)/N = H (X 2 |X 1 ) − H (X 2 |X 3 ) by Lemma 1 and [26] .
2) Key Rate: The key rate is
where (a) holds because F X M ∩ K X M = ∅, and where we have used Lemma 1 and [26] for the first limit.
3) Reliability:
We do not detail the reliability analysis for Terminal 1, since it is similar to the analysis for Terminal 3.
Let i ∈ 1, k − 1 . Note that Terminal 3 forms an accurate estimate of U 1:N i [H X 2 |X 3 ] only when U 1:N i+1 is correctly reconstructed (see Remark 5) . We note 
4) Key Uniformity:
Similarly to Lemma 2 we have the key uniformity for each block.
Lemma 17: Uniformity of [K i ,K i ] holds for each block, where i ∈ 1, k − 1 . Specifically,
Hence, we also have
The global key K 1:k is asymptotically uniform as, similarly to the proof of Theorem 2 in Section III-C5, we have U(S N ) = |K 1:k | − H (K 1:k ) k Nδ N . 
5) Strong
where (a) holds by independence between K i and all the other random variables, (b) holds by definition of K i ,K i , K i , and F (2) i , (c) holds because (V X 2 \H X 2 |X 1 ) ∪ (V X 2 ∩ H X 2 |X 1 ∩ F X M ) ⊂ V X 2 because conditioning reduces entropy, (d) holds by definition of V X 2 .
Then, we obtain for i ∈ 2, k − 1 ,
where (a) holds by definition of M i , (b) holds by (32) 6) Seed Rate: The seed rate is
where we have used Lemma 1 and [26] .
